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HOLMES’S “PATH OF THE LAW” AS NON-ANALYTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Dan Priel* 
 
[This essay will be published in a special issue of 35 University of Queensland Law Journal 
(2016) dedicated to favorite law review articles.] 
 
Abstract: Despite being widely read and the source of numerous oft-cited aphorisms “The Path of 
the Law” remains elusive. To put the matter starkly: What is its thesis? Does it have one? How can we 
reconcile its matter-of-factly opening pages and its almost mystical conclusion? For some this was 
just proof that Holmes was a superficial and contradictory thinker; for others it suggested that 
“Path” should be read  a series of interesting insights and arresting phrases, and nothing more. In 
this essay I suggest reading Holmes’s famous speech as an essay with a thesis about, well, the path 
of the law. I argue that the essay should be divided into three parts, roughly corresponding to the 
law’s past, present, and future. This approach to jurisprudence was popular in the nineteenth 
century, but almost disappeared in course of the twentieth century. The rise of ahistorical analytic 
jurisprudence and the decline of grand narratives from historiography made Holmes’s main point 
easy to miss. But in both jurisprudence and history intellectual climates seem to be changing, 
making it easier for contemporary audiences to read and accept Holmes’s essay as part of the genre 
of evolutionary jurisprudence, to which it belongs.  
 
Introduction 
According to Mark Twain’s classic definition, a classic is “something that everybody wants 
to have read and nobody wants to read.” By that measure “The Path of the Law”1 is not a 
classic. Its relative brevity (take note U.S. law professors) and six footnotes (take note U.S. 
student editors) have surely helped to keep it read and discussed one hundred and twenty 
years after its publication. It is, perhaps, a classic in a different sense, in the sense that, say, 
“The Problem of Social Cost” is not. Though possibly more “influential,” one doesn’t need 
to read Coase’s essay to get its main ideas; in fact, as what is now known as the Coase 
theorem is not stated explicitly in it, it is probably easier to understand Coase’s essay and 
                                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Thanks to Charles 
Barzun for his comments on an earlier draft. 
1 O.W. Holmes¸ The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). Further citations are made 
parenthetically. Though this is the most familiar citation, it is not the essay’s first publication. “Path” 
was first published in issue 4 of volume 1 of the Boston Law School Magazine (dated February 1897), 
a few weeks prior to its reprint in issue 8 of volume 10 of Harvard Law Review (dated March 25, 
1897). That this was the first publication is confirmed in a letter from OWH to Clare Castletown (Feb. 
11, 1897) at 1. 
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appreciate its significance, by learning the theorem before reading it.2 With “Path”, a large 
part of what makes it worth reading is the way it is written.  
But the very same things that make “Path” worth reading also make it difficult to pin 
down. For all of the article’s fame, what does it stand for? Though widely read, its “thesis” 
remains elusive; superficially it is not even apparent that it has one. It is easy to read “Path” 
as a series of loosely-jointed thoughts that move, sometimes within the space of a single 
paragraph, from the breathtakingly abstract to the most technically concrete. In this fairly 
short “discourse” (472) Holmes talks about history, economics, philosophy, psychology, 
and criminology; he makes references to Roman, English and American law; he discusses 
doctrines from contract, tort, and criminal law. Together with the brilliant aphorisms the 
effect is dazzling upon first encounter, but does all this add up to a clear and coherent 
thesis?  
Anyone who wishes to answer this question today is not aided by any of the trappings 
of contemporary academic writing. There is no abstract, no divisions into sections, no 
signposting (“Part I will show; then in part II I will argue”), no real attempt to place the 
piece within existing literature. Those who read the article often struggled to find a 
consistent view that reconciles the no nonsense “positivism” of the essay’s opening pages 
with the “metaphysical” reflections of its peroration. The very first words of the essay—
“When we study the law we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession” 
(457)—seem at odds with the rather mysterious words of the final sentence, that it is only 
by looking into the “remoter and more general aspects of the law” that “you not only 
become a great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and 
catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal 
law” (478).3  
“The Path of the Law” has been the subject of extensive (and widely divergent) 
commentary,4 and I don’t expect this essay to end the conversation about it. What I try to 
do here instead is present “Path” as an essay with a thesis. I will try to show that thesis 
makes sense of the essay as an essay and reconciles many of its apparent tensions. To do 
                                                                 
2 Coase himself stated that he did not notice the full significance of his article until some time 
after its publication. See R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 
717 (1992).  
3 For one example of puzzlement over how to reconcile the two parts of the essay see Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 929–31 (1951). Repulsed by what 
he thought Holmes said in the beginning of the essay, Hart thought the only possible solution was 
“rejecting what Holmes said in the first part of the speech.” Id. at 931. 
4 In 1997, the article’s one hundredth anniversary, Harvard Law Review, Brooklyn Law Review, 
and Boston University Law Review published symposium issues on the article. Another symposium 
was published as The Path of the Law and Its Legacy (Steven Burton ed., 2000). And there are 
numerous other articles dedicated to this essay and to Holmes’s thought, not all of it is by any 
means favorable. For examples of critical work on Holmes see ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT 
VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000); Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A 
Dissenting Opinion (pts. 1 & 2), 15 STAN. L. REV. 3, 254 (1962–63); Hart, supra note 3; Louise Weinberg, 
Holmes’ Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691 (1998). 
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that may be seen as an attempt at clipping an angel’s wings. “Path” is a classic (that word 
again) of the “English” essay, the seemingly effortless extempore, part of whose charm lies 
precisely in eschewing a clear thesis.5 But it would be wrong to think that Holmes thought 
of this piece as a causal collection of bon mots. Holmes’s private correspondence shows he 
considered the essay an important statement on the law.6 He would have been less than 
justified in thinking that, and we should have been far less interested in it today, if “Path” 
were just a series of arresting aphorrisms.  
The Argumentative Path of “The Path of the Law”  
As I read it, Holmes’s argument consists of three steps. In the first Holmes seeks to dispel 
some myths about the relationship between legal and moral obligation; in the second he 
challenges a view nowadays known as “formalism”; and in the third he proposes an 
alternative approach to legal thought. But the first two steps are not just a correction of an 
error, they are also two stages in the development, or path, of the law. Since much of the 
argument has been, I think, shrouded in several misunderstandings, it is important to 
begin with a presentation of what the argument in each of the steps says. Then, in the next 
section I explain the sense in which the parts of the essay correspond to the three resting 
points in the path of the law. 
First Step: The Misunderstood Bad Man 
The state has power to bring about what it wants, and the law is a collection of information 
from which we can predict when this power is likely to be exercised. Lawyers are people 
who acquired expertise in that information and whose business is to provide that 
information to others. This is Holmes’s starting point and it seeks to disabuse his hearers 
from thinking of law in grander terms. So understood law is not exactly power: it is 
information about the likely ways power is going to be exercised.  
To make his point Holmes invoked the bad man, and if there ever was a misunderstood 
idea, this is it. Holmes anticipated the misunderstanding and attempted to thwart it:   
I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret what I have to say as the language 
of cynicism. The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the 
history of the moral development of the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends 
to make good citizens and good men. (459). 
This warning was to no avail. Holmes and his bad man have become shorthand for an 
amoral, even immoral, view of law and society.7 Holmes may well have had some unusual 
                                                                 
5 See Neil Duxbury, When Trying Is Failing: Holmes’s Englishness, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 145, 151, 158 
(1997). Interestingly, Holmes uses British spelling (“defence,” “programme”) in “Path,” although not 
entirely consistently (“labor”). 
6 See Letter from OWH to Clare Castletown (Jan. 11, 1897) at 2 (calling it “my long projected 
discourse on the law”). 
7 ALSCHULER, supra note 4, at 134–35; Hart, supra note 3, at 932 (“to see law truly we must look at 
it the way a bad man does. Why that helps, unless to make us more effective counsellors of evil, I 
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views about these matters, but they have little to do with the bad man. By invoking him 
Holmes made two interrelated points, one substantive and the other epistemic. The 
substantive point is that it does not matter what lawyers say or even believe about the law, 
if those beliefs are not accompanied by action. This is most obvious in the case of laws that 
are “on the books” but not enforced. The second point was more subtle, and it is relevant 
even for those cases the law is enforced.  
Consider Holmes’s notorious claim that a contract is an option to perform or pay 
damages (462). Imagine you responded to Holmes saying “you are wrong, Mr. Holmes, 
because there is a legal principle that says that contracts should be performed.” For effect 
you would add the Latin maxim “pacta sunt servanda” and say it is a familiar legal 
principle recognized in numerous legal materials. Would this have impressed Holmes? Not 
at all. He would have replied: “Imagine I did breach the contract, despite this principle, 
what would the law’s response be?” The reply would be: “you would have to pay damages.” 
What Holmes says here is not that breaches of contract are sometimes desirable; his view is 
entirely consistent with the idea that all breaches of contract are morally wrong. Rather, it is 
the claim that even if this is the case, and even if “the law says” that one should never 
breach one’s contracts, this in fact has no legal effect.  
This view is sometimes criticized with the argument Holmes’s view ignores the fact that 
the existence of a legal norm may lead some people to behave differently, because they 
respect the law. Holmes’s point is false, it is argued, because such people will behave in one 
way if the law says that it is wrong to breach a contract and in another if the law says that 
one has a choice between performing and paying damages. Stephen Smith, for instance, 
wrote that “the law presents itself as a normative institution—as an institution that tells 
citizens how they ought to behave…[and t]here are legal rules specifying that contracts 
should be performed….”8 And this, he added in another essay, is a good thing even from a 
utilitarian perspective, because the mere fact that some people obey the law because it is 
the law, will change their behavior depending on the message sent by the law.9 
The “law presents itself” is how lawyers present it, and it is not obvious to me that this 
is how all lawyers present the law. Many very prominent lawyers, including judges 
(Holmes, let us not forget, was one) do not present it in this way; so I am not sure on what 
basis Smith says that “the law presents itself” as demanding that “contracts should be 
performed.” But even assuming Smith is right, this cuts no ice against Holmes. Holmes 
need not deny—in fact he accepted—that the law has all kinds of effects of people’s 
behavior. Holmes himself says that familiar lawyer jokes notwithstanding (“in spite of 
popular jests”), the practice of law “tends to make good citizens and good men” (459). 
What matters is that not everyone is so affected by the law, and for those uninfluenced by 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
have never understood.”); Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes, and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569 (1943); cf. 
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1773 
(1976) (“The certainty of individualism is perfectly embodied in the calculations of Holmes’ ‘bad 
man,’ who is concerned with the law only as a means or an obstacle to the accomplishment of his 
antisocial ends.”). 
8 Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Contract Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 221 (2011). 
9 Stephen A. Smith, Duties, Liabilities, and Damages, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1733–34 (2012). 
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the law it makes no practical difference whether breaches of contract are considered 
wrongs because as a matter of fact the real-world effect of breach makes it 
indistinguishable from giving an option to breach. Put another way, some people will treat 
the law as imposing obligations requiring contract performance; but those who do not will 
not be legally worse off as a result. For this reason this view gives a more accurate account of 
what the law actually requires.  
So understood Holmes’s claim is not meant to be a claim about the “nature” of 
contractual obligation or promises in the abstract. (I very much doubt Holmes would have 
thought it made much sense to speak things.) We can imagine a legal system in which 
breaches of contract, or at least intentional breaches, are criminalized and punished by 
imprisonment. As even in such a regime contractual breaches remain an option, the real 
alternative would be the case in which the state actively makes sure contracts are being 
performed and uses its force to enforce compliance. In fact, as Holmes points out, equity 
does do something like that (462), but as it happens, said Holmes, this was the exception 
rather than the rule. Holmes’s point, then, is empirical: The common law as it actually was 
in his day (and largely as it is today) treated contractual obligation as a choice between 
performance or the payment of damages. 
The bad man plays a useful analytical role in reaching this conclusion. He is an 
epistemic device for knowing what the law requires. Holmes made it quite clear when he 
said: 
When I emphasize the difference between law and morals I do so with reference to a single 
end, that of learning and understanding the law. For that purpose you must definitely master 
its specific marks, and it is for that that I ask you for the moment to imagine yourselves 
indifferent to other and greater things. (459.) 
As defined, the bad man is completely self-interested, and therefore does not want to 
incur the wrath of the law. Precisely for this reason he is useful. If we looked at how the 
good man behaved we could never be sure from his behavior what the law required, for we 
could never tell whether he acted in the way he did because he believed it to be morally 
wrong (even though not illegal), or because he refrained from doing it because he was 
acting out of fear of legal sanction. There is no such risk with the bad man. Having no moral 
compunctions, his imagined actions are a better guide for knowing what the law requires. 
In the language of contemporary social science, to know what the law requires, we need to 
“control” for the possible influence of other norms. To do that we need to look for someone 
who sees himself as a calculating promoter of his self-interest,10 someone who is not 
swayed by any other norms. Thinking about the law through the eyes of the bad man helps 
with that goal. On the assumption that the bad man always acts with an eye to the 
promotion of his interests, it is by looking at his actions that we can learn the real content 
of the law and nothing but the law. To be sure, the other ways in which the law influences 
                                                                 
10 Cf. DIEGO GAMBETTA, CODES OF UNDERWORLD: HOW CRIMINALS COMMUNICATE 31 (2009) 
(“Criminals embody homo economicus at his rawest, and they know it. In keeping with the evidence 
that people who are untrustworthy are also more likely to think that others are untrustworthy, 
criminals are more inclined to distrust each other than ordinary people.”) (footnote omitted). 
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the behavior of some people is no less real when it happens, but that is (in a way) a positive 
side effect. It is only when legal institutions respond to certain actions, that we can talk 
about what the law “does.”  
It might still be objected that the “confusion” of law and morals is a good thing, for it 
guarantees that people see the law in a good light. If many people started thinking like the 
bad man in order to discover what the law requires, that could have negative 
consequences. To the extent that the prediction theory did give a normative prescription, it 
seems to encourage not compliance with the law, but an attempt to get away with breaking 
the law, if only possible.11 But once again, this charge assumes that the bad man is a guide 
to action, whereas it is only meant as a guide for clearing one’s thought about the limits of 
the law, as set by its limited powers. Holmes made it clear when he told his listeners he was 
asking them only “for the moment to imagine [them]selves indifferent to other and greater 
things,” in order to help them to “understand [law’s] limits” (459).  
This, I believe, is the entire role Holmes gave the bad man. It is a minimalist, disarming 
reading of this idea. It differs from those who have found in the bad man the kernel of far 
more contentious claims: I do not think that Holmes “claims that it is unintelligible to 
assert that there is a duty to behave in a particular way, unless one is simply asserting that 
the failure to behave as described will be attended by certain consequences.”12 It is 
perfectly intelligible to think of people who feel an obligation to act in certain ways 
regardless of consequences. Holmes in fact held in highest regard those individuals who 
acted out of a sense of obligation they could not explain, who were committed to a cause 
that had no discernable consequence (positive or otherwise).13 Similarly, I do not think 
Holmes believed “all human beings are, ultimately, bad men” in the sense that they are 
“only on the basis of reasons of prudential self-interest.”14 Holmes may have had a rather 
sinister view of life, but as just mentioned he clearly recognized people acting for motives 
other than self-interest. It may even be that Holmes’s admiration for those who dedicated 
themselves to pointless activities for no apparent personal gain and to those who died in 
battle defending causes they did not believe in, was because these people showed him that 
                                                                 
11 Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 687 (1995) (“The 
prediction model, if widely accepted, would breed disrespect for law by encouraging the people to 
act like Holmes’ bad man, understanding the law as imposing an obligation not to get caught, rather 
than an obligation to conform to a norm.”); David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A 
Centennial Essay on Holmes’s The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1573–74 (1997). 
12 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in 
Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 693 (2001). 
13 “I do not know the meaning of the universe. But in the midst of doubt, in the collapse of 
creeds, there is one thing I do not doubt, that no man who lives in the same world with most of us 
can doubt, and that is that the faith is true and adorable which leads a soldier to throw away his life 
in obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan of 
campaign of which he has little notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use.” Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, in SPEECHES 56, 59 (1913). 
14 Stephen R. Perry, Holmes versus Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory 158, 172 (Steven J. Burton 
ed., 2000). 
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for all his cynicism humans were capable of other-regarding acts. In any event, I do not 
think the bad man was meant as a commentary on human nature. 
If I am right about this, then most arguments leveled at the “bad man” do not address 
Holmes’s point at all. Holmes does not want to create laws for the bad man15—such a 
suggestion does not make sense, because the bad man simply looks to existing laws, 
whatever their content, and adjusts his behavior to them—nor does Holmes invoke the bad 
man to show us the way to creating good law.16 All he says is that in finding out what the 
law’s demands, it is important not to confuse what the law requires with other non-legal 
norms. This may sound obvious, even tautological (“if you want to know what the law 
requires, you’d better find out what the law requires, not what other norms require”), but 
Holmes suggested that the similar terminology of law and morality can make this task 
rather difficult. He suggested the bad man test as a way of addressing it.  
While a useful idea in the modest way described above, the bad man should not be 
taken too literally. If one tries, its limitations immediately become evident: many real-life 
bad men have other norms that they abide by, so we would not be able to make a confident 
inference from his actions to what the law requires; the bad man may on occasion follow 
the law for self-interested reasons (such as maintaining a certain reputation); or he may be 
willing to break the law whenever he estimates the probable benefits of the crime to be 
higher than its probable costs. If our bad man is realistic enough, he will have to 
incorporate into our thinking the fact that enforcement is never perfect.17 So the bad man 
will not just look at what courts do, but also at what out other law-enforcement agencies 
do.18  
All these well-known criticisms are significant only if we take the bad man as a guide to 
action, which quite clearly was not Holmes’s intention. Somewhat surprisingly, the bad 
man idea may be problematic even for the modest role Holmes gave it but for the opposite 
reason from the one usually thought. The bad man will not lead people to immorality, but 
                                                                 
15 See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 31 
(1988) (“we do not need to follow Justice Holmes’ advice and write laws for the ‘bad man’”); 
ALSCHULER, supra note 4, at 144 (“Holmes’ bad man was not a lawyer; he was a consumer of law. 
Holmes’ definition of law was for him.”).  
16 This is the reading suggested in Marco Jimenez, Finding the Good in Holmes’s Bad Man, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2069 (2011). Crucial to Jimenez’s argument is the following sentence: “The practice 
of [law], in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men” (459). Jimenez takes 
Holmes to say that law is and should be designed to turn people into good people. But all Holmes is 
saying here is that as a matter of fact the practice of law, membership and work within the legal 
profession, tends to create good people. On the basis of this reading Jimenez goes on to argue, for 
example, that “as a descriptive matter, the Learned Hand formula brilliantly captures how the bad 
man actually behaves.” Jimenez, supra, at 2123. But that cannot be true: Holmes’s bad man seeks to 
minimize his legal liabilities. The bad will follow the Hand formula only if the courts adopt it as their 
standard for tort liability.  
17 Holmes was surely aware of this, given his emphasis on the future significance of statistics 
and economics to the study of law (469). 
18 See ALSCHULER, supra note 4, at 145–46; William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 CORNELL 
L. REV. 275, 283, 289–91 (1973). 
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will not help in clarifying what the law requires. Here is why: In order for the bad man to 
know what the law requires he will have to take into account the social and moral attitudes 
of legal officials. Holmes stressed in numerous writings throughout his life, including in 
“Path,” that the content of law is determined by much more than texts: “We do not realize 
how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of 
the public mind” (466). That is why it is a mistake to attribute to Holmes the view that “law 
is something entirely separate from morals.”19 Law is constantly affected by prevailing 
moral norms. Significantly, this connection between law and prevailing social norms does 
not depend on the existence of “moral phraseology” (463) in legal texts. Even without any 
moral term in a contract, “[y]ou can always imply a condition in a contract” (466), and 
when you do so it is “because of some opinion as to policy, or…because of some attitude of 
yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement” (466).  
This implies that the bad man who wishes to avoid the force of the law directed at him 
will have to study the values of the judges (and other legal officials) and incorporate those 
into his thinking in order to know what the law requires. Indeed, if the bad man ignored 
these moral attitudes in seeking to determine what the law required, he would occasionally 
err in his predictions about the likely use of state force. Moreover, the bad man who tries to 
identify the requirements of the law in this way may have to go through the same reasoning 
processes as the good man. The self-interested bad man will simply try to estimate what 
other people think morality requires, rather than attempt to figure out what morality 
actually requires, but doing the former will often require more than merely parroting 
accepted social norms. In cases where the law is unclear, the bad man will have to try and 
predict the way judges will use certain moral concepts. Therefore, in order to predict the 
law, the bad man will have to incorporate the values he predicts the judge will employ, and 
will thus have to take into account and rely on the same “confusions” of law and morals 
that judges (or other officials) commit. If this challenge is successful, the result will be that 
the bad man will not be able to identify the distinct normative impact of the law.  
There are two answers to this challenge. The first is that even in the world in which 
judges and others blur the boundary between legal and moral norms, there is still a 
difference between what the good man thinks the law requires and what it actually 
requires. Even if you believe that a contract entails an obligation to perform the contract 
(because you believe contracts are grounded in promises, and it is immoral to break one’s 
promises), this will not make a difference unless the legal system takes certain actions to 
prevent contract breaches (or treats some contract breaches differently from others). Here, 
it may be nothing more prosaic than the lack of resources that makes it impossible to police 
contract performance, or the slowness of the judicial process, that may thwart such a view 
from being turned into legal reality. But all this does not matter: there is still a difference 
between what a good man may say the law requires, and what a bad man (even one who 
incorporates accepted moral values) will say the law requires.  
The second response is that Holmes actually thought that the confusion of legal and 
moral language is undesirable because it can lead to bad law. This may sound odd, even 
                                                                 
19 Hart, supra note 3, at 932. 
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vile—how could moral laws be bad?—but it is less menacing than it sounds. As this is one 
of the themes of the third part of Holmes’s essay, I will keep the discussion of this point for 
later.  
Second Step: Dismantling Langdell’s Theology 
In the second part of his essay Holmes turns to the question of knowing the law’s content 
and its development. And here Holmes targets “a second fallacy” (465), which is the view 
that to know what the law requires is an internal conceptual inquiry, what Holmes calls 
“logic,” a view nowadays known as “formalism.” But Holmes’s views cannot be understood 
unless we distinguish between two quite distinct views for which the label is often 
attached. 
Of the various ideas often associated with formalism, let me focus on two: autonomy 
and deduction. The former relates to the question whether law is largely autonomous of 
other disciplines and other normative systems; whether, if you wish, it is “open” or “closed.” 
By autonomous I mean that law’s content can be (and ought to be) determined largely by 
reference to legal materials alone. The other idea is that the answer to legal question is 
arrived at by deduction from general principles to particular cases. Here, the question is 
whether legal thought is (ideally) “top-down” or “bottoms-up.” Though formalists are 
thought to hold both, and some do, the two are logically independent. Keeping them apart 
allows us to identify two “formalist” positions and two anti-formalist (“realist”) positions: 
 
 Top-down Bottoms-up 
Open Scientific legal realism 
(Felix Cohen) 
Traditional legal realism 
(Llewellyn) 
Closed Conceptualism (German 
Begriffsjurisprudenz) 
Doctrinalism (Langdell?) 
 
One view, what Germans call Begriffsjurisprudenz and we can call “conceptualism,” is 
the view that we can derive the outcomes to particular cases deductively from certain 
abstract concepts. The other view, which I call “doctrinalism,” avoids the metaphysical 
abstractions of the conceptualists in favor of a detailed analysis of cases from which 
general conclusions are derived. Though different from conceptualism in this regard, its 
proponents still maintain that law is (relatively) autonomous. The two views still exist 
today, and though sometimes aligned together in their opposition to interdisciplinary 
approaches to law, they are rather different from each other. A rough and ready way of 
distinguishing between the two is the frequency of citations to cases. Conceptualists rarely 
cite cases, and even when they do, use them only to illustrate ideas whose normative force 
is completely independent of their endorsement in legal sources. Doctrinalists are the 
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“black-letter lawyers” who derive their account of the law from their mastery of the fine 
details of the law found in hundreds of cases.20 
Holmes did not distinguish between the two views, but clearly thought both positions 
were wrong. There is no question that in his many attacks on those who grounded law in 
“logic” (465) he targeted the conceptualists.21 In a later essay Holmes criticized “[t]he 
jurists who believe in natural law,” because, he said, they “seem to me to be in that naïve 
state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and their 
neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere.”22 These 
conceptualists do not realize that what they present as universal, timeless truths are 
nothing more than what they are familiar with. Doctrinalists are on firmer ground, because 
the law (or at least the common law) always starts with cases and develops general 
principles later. At the same time doctrinalists are also mistaken if they think that legal 
materials provided a complete explanation of the law’s development, that the law and its 
progress are fairly autonomous. The charge that “our law is open to reconsideration upon a 
slight change in the habit of the public mind” (466) is a challenge to “closed” views of law 
whether legal principles originate in the cases or in pure reason.23 
Which of the two remaining approaches was Holmes’s? The answer is, in a way, both. 
To put the matter briefly, he saw the law of his time as derived from the cases, which 
themselves reflected the changing moral values of a community (the “history [of law] is the 
history of the moral development of the race” (459)). But he also expressed hope that in the 
future law would change in a more scientific direction.  
Holmes’s acceptance of the fact that the law is derived from the cases, but that the law 
found in them is itself influenced by external influences puts him in the category I call 
“traditional legal realism.” It is traditional in the sense that in terms of its practice it seeks to 
retain the common law in its fairly familiar form, but it acknowledges (and even celebrates) 
external influences into the law. Many legal realists, most notably Karl Llewellyn, adopted 
this view.24 This “openness” is usually derived from a view to the foundations of the 
authority of law. Llewellyn was quite clear that the law is justified to the extent that it is 
                                                                 
20 For a further discussion see Dan Priel, Formalism, Doctrinalism, Realism: An Essay on the 
Philosophy of Legal Doctrine (unpublished manuscript). To make the distinction concrete: ERNEST 
J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) is an example of conceptualism; ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS 
AND RIGHTS (2007) is an example of doctrinalism. 
21 For the argument that a central theme of The Common Law is a critique of German legal 
science, or what I call “conceptualism,” see Matthias W. Reimann, Holmes’s Common Law and 
German Legal Science, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 72, 85 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 
1992). 
22 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918). 
23 In the popular legal imagination Langdell was a conceptualist. This characterization has been 
disputed by various scholars, who argued that he derived legal principles from the cases. See, e.g., 
Raimann, supra note 21, at 107–08. The paucity of Langdell’s theoretical writings makes it difficult to 
be certain, and it may be that he himself shifted between the two positions. In any event, to the 
extent that he adopted a “closed” approach, he was a valid target for Holmes’s criticisms. 
24 I assert here what I defend at length in Dan Priel, Legal Realisms (unpublished manuscript).  
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derived from “the people,” and he was correspondingly quite critical of attempts to turn 
law into a science.25  
This view was very different from the view of a different group of legal realists, of which 
Felix Cohen is the best-known exponent. This group was skeptical of the existing methods 
of the law and thought the only path to improving the law necessitated the adoption of the 
methods of the natural sciences. These “scientific legal realists” have expressed greater 
confidence in experts (and not the people) as those who should be entrusted with deciding 
important questions of social choice. Holmes’s remarks on the need for a more scientific 
approach to the study of law illustrate his support for this view as well.  
These distinctions also explain Holmes’s judicial practice. Many who read Holmes’s 
judgments have been surprised to discover in it what is described as a formalist streak of 
affirming decisions in a rather unimaginative fashion by following past cases.26 The 
distinction between the two senses of formalism and two senses of realism helps us 
understand Holmes’s position and why he was less contradictory than is often thought. 
There is no contradiction between the famous Holmesian slogans that “[t]he life of the law 
has not been logic; it has been experience” and “a page of history is worth a volume of 
logic”27 and his general practice of faithfully following precedent. As an observer of legal 
practice, Holmes could explain why both the top-down and the bottoms-up formalist 
approaches were mistaken, because both minimized the role of prevailing values in fixing 
the content of the law. In the terminology used earlier, both had a “closed” vision of law, 
when in fact law was “open”: legal doctrine was always influenced by ideas that came from 
outside of the law. But as a judge, Holmes did not think it was his role to pass judgment on 
those values, he simply upheld their legal implications. To the extent that past cases 
reflected the values of the community, it was his job to affirm those value judgments 
embedded in the law, even if those differed from his. On other occasions, the law had to 
make a more-or-less technical choice between two possibilities, and here too there was no 
point in disturbing existing rules whenever they existed. This was a central component in 
Holmes’s approach to adjudication, and he derived it from his recognition that his own 
convictions were not more justifiable than those of others, a view he translated to a rather 
minimalist of the role of a judge in a democracy. This was not just Holmes’s attitude to 
following precedent. It was at the foundation of his justification for democracy (as a 
mechanism for different ideas held by different groups to try and win the day), the central 
role he gave to freedom of speech (and his justification for it in terms of marketplace of 
                                                                 
25 The clearest statement is in K.N. Llewellyn, American Common Law Tradition and American 
Democracy, 1 J. LEGAL & POL. SOC. 14 (1942). For further evidence see Dan Priel, Conceptions of 
Authority and the Anglo-American Common Law Divide, 69 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2016/17), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2769302, at 22–25. 
26 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
719, 726–29 (1982); NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 32–46 (1995). My remarks 
should not be taken to suggest that everything Holmes ever wrote was entirely consistent.  
27 Coming, respectively, from O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881); New York Trust Co. v. 
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
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ideas), his Lochner28 dissent and his generally minimalist approach to judicial review29—all 
fit this general outlook. It is precisely because the law reflected prevailing values (and did 
not answer its own “logic”) that Holmes could justify many of his “formalist” (i.e., non-
interventionist, precedent-following) decisions. 
Third Step: From Historicist Doctrinalism to Cost-Benefit Analysis 
One way of looking at the two fallacies Holmes attacks is as two opposite positions: the first 
blurs the distinction between law and morals; the second seeks to avoid this confusion by 
eliminating all ties between law and morality by trying to reduce all legal reasoning to 
logic. Holmes rejects these two extremes and in the third part of the essay proposes a 
(limited) solution. The solution comes in two flavors, one that explains the present, 
another which is a prescription for the future. The present approach avoids the two 
extremes by turning to doctrine, in effect by way of a form of historical analysis. In this 
approach history plays a positive role in telling us what the law: since law is the repository 
of the values of the community, and since those values are central to determining the law, 
it is through the analysis of the “scattered prophecies of the past” that we can know “the 
cases in which the axe will fall” (457).  
When I say that at this stage history has a positive role in explaining the law I mean that 
through the analysis of certain historical facts (the outcomes of past cases), we determine 
how cases should be decided, what the content of the law should be. Holmes’s prediction 
was that in the future history would play a more negative role: History will remain 
indispensable for examining the circumstances in which a certain law was made, which in 
turn will be important for determining whether it should still be retained when 
circumstances have changed. But in the future history will no longer play a positive role in 
determining what the law should be. Holmes thus predicted (rather accurately) that 
backward-looking doctrine will decline in significance in shaping of the law and that 
forward-looking policy will assume a more prominent place in legal justification. Holmes 
described this memorably with the following evocative image: 
History must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope of 
rules which it is our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, because it is the first 
step toward an enlightened scepticism, that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the 
worth of those rules. When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the 
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him 
out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful 
animal. (469.)30 
                                                                 
28 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes J., dissenting). 
29 This approach is best captured in a striking phrase he once in a letter to Laski: “if my fellow 
citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to 
Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES–LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE 
HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916–1925, at 248, 249 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). 
30 In a later essay Holmes was less metaphorical: “From a practical point of view, as I have 
illustrated upon another occasion, [history’s] use is mainly negative and skeptical.” Oliver Wendell 
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Getting the dragon out of the cave is history’s negative role, it is the one that will help us see 
the social circumstances that existed when a legal rule was adopted and whether they are 
no longer in place. But this is not enough for taming or killing the dragon, i.e. for finding an 
alternative to it. For this the law in the future will rely on a different approach. In words 
appearing immediately after the words just quoted, Holmes famously wrote: “For the 
rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man 
of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics” (469). 
Holmes not only predicted this change, he also “look[ed] forward to a time when the 
part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of 
ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained 
and the reasons for desiring them” (474). Several commentators noticed that Holmes did 
not always follow up this hope with action. His judicial practice often reveals a tendency to 
justify outcomes with references to past cases, showing little willingness to examine 
whether the rationale for the doctrine justified maintaining it.  
Some said that when Holmes delivered his address he was too old, or perhaps too lazy, 
to adapt to this new way of doing law.31 Holmes indeed professed himself bored by matters 
of fact,32 but once again, there is no inconsistency in the two views. As mentioned before, 
Holmes thought it wrong to impose his own value preferences on a public that may have 
had other value preferences. The shift toward the scientific approach is one such value 
preference, and as such it should first be accepted by the public, before it can be adopted 
by the judiciary. In his capacity as a public intellectual Holmes could try and use the 
marketplace of ideas to persuade people to turn to this new approach, but it was an abuse 
of his role as a judge to adopt it beforehand.  
Still, this last step may seem surprising given Holmes’s overall skeptical tendencies. 
Holmes did not think there was any rational way of winning a debate over ends. Holmes 
said as much in “Path” when he explained that “an evolutionist” such as himself “will 
hesitate to affirm universal validity for his social ideals” (468). How, then, could statistics 
and economics help us answer these questions? Holmes made two distinct points. The first 
is that economics teaches us that “for everything we have to give up something else, and 
we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose, and to 
know what we are doing when we elect” (474). One bad consequence of “[t]he present 
divorce between the schools of political economy and law” (474) and the tendency to think 
of law in moralistic and historicist terms is the mistaken view that areas like tort law are the 
embodiment of moral principles. Much of this area of law, says Holmes, has its origins in 
“ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like,” where “damages might be taken to 
lie where they fell by legal judgment” (467). But the reality is that tort law was becoming a 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 452 (1899). This is almost certainly 
an oblique reference to “The Path of the Law.”  
31 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 837 (1989). 
32 See, e.g., Letter from O.W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 26, 1919), in 2 HOLMES–POLLOCK 
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874–1932, at 13, 13–
14 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942). 
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mechanism for transferring costs to the public, and the question lawyers had to think 
about is the extent to which the public should do that, “how much the public should insure 
the safety of those whose work it uses” (467). This will require calculating “the value of a life 
to the community” (467) and limit recovery to those lives worth saving. Here, Holmes 
suggests, the confusion of law and morals could be thought as not just leading lawyers to 
misperceive the limits of the law’s powers, but to actually promote bad laws. For the 
confusion of law and morals, Holmes suggested, tended to incorporate deontological ideas 
into the law, specifically the idea that duties should not be broken no matter what. And 
this, Holmes thought, was a mistake: social choice requires the balancing of costs and 
benefits, not the peddling of moral absolutes.  
Holmes’s second point is a distinction between ends and means: “a body of law is 
more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and 
definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are 
stated or are ready to be stated in words” (469). Ends may not be the subject of rational 
deliberation, but means definitely are; and economics, Holmes thought, is the science of 
means.33  
And it is here that we can understand the essay’s concluding pages. In one sense what 
Holmes says there is rather familiar, and in the context the essay was first delivered, to be 
expected. Holmes’s speech was a specimen of the vocational address given by a grey 
eminence to those about to embark onto life in the law. The straightforward reading of 
these pages is that in them Holmes finally gave his listeners (or perhaps inviters) some of 
the banalities demanded by the occasion. And though undoubtedly something Holmes 
genuinely believed in, nothing is more banal than a reminder to young people that there is 
more to life than making money.  
Even here, however, Holmes delivered this familiar message in a rather unusual way. 
One should seek more than money, he said, because it was ideas that ruled the world. And 
so those who seek power, should seek the power of ideas. We can make some sense of it 
when considered against what came before: The great sin committed by those who wanted 
to reduce law to “logic” was that they unmoored it from life; the concluding pages are, in a 
way, the same point, only pushed further. There are no cosmic answers to the questions of 
right and wrong and to the meaning of life, but there is value in living the effort trying to 
answer them, and in fighting to have them win the day. And it is here that we find the key 
through which Holmes’s audience of future lawyers may “catch an echo of the infinite, a 
glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law” (478): It is by thinking and 
challenging ourselves our values that we give meaning to law, to life, and to life in the law. 
                                                                 
33 Holmes thus seems to have rejected the view, adopted a generation later by Felix Cohen, that 
science could provide an answer even to question of ends. See Felix S. Cohen, The Subject Matter of 
Ethical Science, 42 INT’L J. ETHICS 397 (1932). But even here, matters are not entirely clear, for Holmes 
also accepted the idea that the foundations of certain moral and legal norms lies in human nature. 
The idea of property, he said, “is in the nature of man’s mind” (477, also 468). Whether this is a 
sound basis for a science of ends is not a topic Holmes discusses, nor will I.  
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“The Path of the Law” as Legal Theory 
I suggested a reading of Holmes’s essay that makes it in certain respects less alarming: the 
bad man is not a model for behavior, it is not the person legislators should have in mind 
when thinking about what to legislate. Holmes’s call for recognition of the costs of social 
choices, including the cost of a life, is now a commonplace.34 Does this make the essay so 
tame that it no longer holds any interest for contemporary readers beyond the purely 
antiquarian? At least in one sense the essay remains relevant—even challenging—to 
present-day readers, and that is by presenting an alternative to dominant views in 
contemporary jurisprudence. One sense in which the essay is out of step with 
contemporary jurisprudence is with its embrace of jurisprudence that adopts the external 
point of view. The dominant view among legal philosophers is that such an approach is 
necessarily faulty. I believe such claims are mistaken, but explaining why is probably better 
left for another occasion. Instead, I want to consider a different sense in which the essay 
poses a challenge to prevailing approaches to legal philosophy, namely in presenting an 
evolutionary account of law.   
Though “Path” is still a fairly common staple in courses on jurisprudence, its 
underlying view on jurisprudence is very much out of step from the dominant approaches 
to legal philosophy today. Holmes was quite clear that he found the kind of questions 
Austin was interested in, the kind of questions that are now gathered under the banner of 
“the nature of law,” as having no bearing on the questions he was asking: “You may 
assume, with Hobbes and Bentham and Austin, that all law emanates from the sovereign, 
even when the first human beings to enunciate it are the judges, or you may think that law 
is the voice of the Zeitgeist, or what you like. It is all one to my present purpose” (465). A 
comment made a few pages later suggests this was more than just indifference to a 
question irrelevant to his inquiries. Holmes apparently believed the whole enterprise 
foolhardly: “Sir James Stephen is not the only writer whose attempts to analyze legal ideas 
have been confused by striving for a useless quintessence of all systems, instead of an 
accurate anatomy of one” (475). And not just, I venture to suggest, because it was useless, 
but because there was no such thing.35 
In a definition that’s difficult to improve upon Holmes said that “[j]urisprudence…is 
simply law in its most generalized part” (474). But it is a mistake to confuse this idea with 
the view that jurisprudence is concerned with what is true of all law at all times and places. 
Holmes presented instead an account of the development of law through time. Early in The 
Common Law Holmes wrote that “[t]he law embodies the story of a nation’s development 
through many centuries….In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and 
                                                                 
34 Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION, at ix, 
passim (2002). 
35 I agree that “it was Holmes’s genius as a philosopher to see that the law has no essential 
aspect.” Louis Menand, The Principles of Oliver Wendell Holmes, in AMERICAN STUDIES 31, 35 (2002). 
For my defense of this claim see Dan Priel, The Misguided Search for the Nature of Law 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2642461.  
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what it tends to become.”36 And it is not just particular legal doctrines that can only be 
understood in evolutionary terms; it is true of the phenomenon of law generally. Though 
“Path” is organized around two debunked fallacies about law and a suggestion for its 
improvement, the three parts can be read as reflecting three stages in the development of 
law: The essay is, after all, called “The Path of the Law.” The three parts of the essay can be 
seen to reflect what might be called Holmes’s three ages of law.  
In the first, law is intuitive, it does not have any underlying theory and the distinction 
between law and social norms is blurry: “It seems to me well to remember,” Holmes once 
wrote, “that men begin with no theory at all, and with no such generalization as contract.”37 
The origin of law and its justification are usually given to supernatural causes. To the 
outside observer, however, law at this stage is “natural” in the sense that it reflects human 
emotions such as revenge. In law’s second age law is increasingly rationalized in the sense 
that legal justification is no longer emotive but rather based on elaborate doctrines. 
Though these are grounded in the moral ideals, the law is now perceived as “a finite body of 
dogma” (458). Typically, the law at this stage becomes elaborate and complex, but its 
grounds remain largely unquestioned. It is filled with “doctrines which for the most part 
still are taken for granted without any deliberate, conscious, and systematic questioning of 
their grounds” (468). The law at this stage is more artificial in the sense that it acquires a 
certain technicality that requires learning and mastery, that makes it less immediately 
accessible to all individual (this is Coke’s “artificial reason of the law”), but it is still natural 
in one sense. The justification of law at this stage is historicist and imitatative. This, says 
Holmes, is “perfectly right and natural”: “Most of the things we do, we do for no better 
reason than that our fathers have done them or that our neighbors do them.” Though it is 
rational to behave this way, “because our short life gives us no time for a better…it is not 
the best” (468). Holmes predicted a second transition away from law as a historical inquiry 
and toward law as a scientific one. This move from the second to the third age will be the 
law’s great transformation, for it is at this point that law will cease to be natural and become 
fully  artificial—and all the better for that.38 It is at this stage that societies use law to shape 
their fate with an eye to improving their lot.  
In this evolutionary story the three ages of law very roughly represent the law’s past, 
present, and future (although Holmes’s call for the elimination of moral language from the 
law amounts to an admission that even the transition from the first to the second stage was 
not been completed in his lifetime, or ours).  
                                                                 
36 HOLMES, supra note 27, at 1. 
37 Holmes, supra note 30, at 448; cf. Anonymous [Oliver Wendell Holmes], Codes, and the 
Arrangement of Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1870) (“It is the merit of the common law that it decides cases 
first and determines principles afterwards”). 
38 Later in life Holmes aligned himself more explicitly with “those of us who believe…in the 
superiority of the artificial to the natural.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Holdsworth’s English Law, 25 
LAW Q. REV. 412, 414 (1909) (book review).  
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The origin of these three ages may have come to Holmes from Auguste Comte, either 
directly, or more likely through his reading of John Stuart Mill.39 Comte described the 
development of humanity in three stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and the 
scientific. In the first explanations are attributed to gods, in the second they are attributed 
to the essences of things, and in the third they are explained in scientific terms.40 The three 
parts of “Path” identified in the previous section roughly correspond to these three 
stopping points in the path of the law. In the first age of the law, it is conflated with higher 
law given to us from the gods; in the second, there is an attempt to rationalize the law in 
terms of the internal essence (“logic”) of certain concepts; in its final stage of development, 
the law will shed these earlier errors and become a scientific endeavor.  
If there is something surprising about that last stage in the law’s development is that it 
will require paying more rather than less attention to question of value. Until its great 
transformation, the law simply sought to address certain disturbances in a rather ad hoc 
way (it was the law of “ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like”). Its 
underlying values were the ones largely accepted in society. But this kind of law was giving 
way to the law that, inevitably, passes judgment on what counts as the good life. We can 
thus read the concluding pages of the essay not just as a general claim about values in the 
law, but an exhortation to the lawyers of the future, those who may live in the third age of 
the law, to recognize that law so conceived will require them to consciously think of “the 
remoter and more general aspects of the law” (478). 
Historical narratives of this sort were popular in the nineteenth century, both in 
general historical writing and in jurisprudence. The preeminent English-language legal 
specimen of this approach is Henry Maine’s Ancient Law, but it was by no means the only 
one.41 Such accounts have fallen on hard times during the second half of the twentieth 
century. Among legal philosophers, the influence of Hart (and Kelsen) on twentieth-
century jurisprudence reoriented legal philosophy away from history and towards 
conceptual investigation that were seen as entirely independent of history.42 As a result 
“Path” was read, despite Holmes’s explicit words to the contrary, as an attempt at offering a 
                                                                 
39 That Holmes was much influenced by Mill (as evidenced also by his extensive reading of his 
writings) is argued in Patrick J. Kelley, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Utilitarian Jurisprudence, and the 
Positivism of John Stuart Mill, 30 AM. J. JURIS. 189, 193–94 (1985) (book review). Mill may also have 
influenced Holmes’s thinking about the superiority of the artificial to the natural. See John Stuart 
Mill, Nature, in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL: ESSAYS ON ETHICS, RELIGION AND 
SOCIETY 373, 381 (J.M. Robson ed., 1969) (“All praise of Civilization, or Art, or Contrivance, is so much 
dispraise of Nature; an admission of imperfection, which it is man’s business, and merit, to be 
always endeavouring to correct or mitigate”). 
40 See PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 76–77 (1980). Kelley also suggested 
the likely influence of Comte (possibly via Mill) on Holmes. See Kelley, supra note 39, at 208–12. 
41 For general discussions of the history of evolutionary thinking in law see STEIN, supra note 40; 
E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985). 
42 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Introduction to JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 
DETERMINED vii, xv (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1954) (“Analytical and historical inquiries provide answers to 
different questions not different answers to the same questions”). 
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theory of the timeless “nature” of law. For their part, historians too found the kind of 
history Holmes was practicing problematic albeit for a different reason. The rise of 
“professional” history meant that earlier historians’ grand narratives now appeared 
amateurish and overly simplistic. Historicism, the view that human history proceeds to the 
tune of some inexorable deterministic path, was discredited as mythical and even 
dangerous. Good history meant a detailed micro-history based on primary, archival 
sources. Historical truth, if it existed at all, lay in minute details, not in sweeping claims 
spanning centuries. 
It seems that the time is ripe for giving more serious attention to the kind of historicist, 
evolutionary, legal theory of the kind Holmes attempted. The barrenness of conceptual 
jurisprudence has many sources, but one of them is its unselfconscious, untroubled pre-
Darwinism, its continued search for explaining human practices in terms of unchanging, 
timeless essences. Within legal philosophy the tide may finally be turning with more 
writers expressing dissatisfaction with the explanatory value, and even very plausibility, of 
this approach. On the historiographical front, recent trends suggest a more sympathetic 
approach to Holmes’s approach. Many historians seem to be warming up to the formerly 
discredited macro-history. Shorn of its Hegelian pretensions, this kind of history has been 
enjoying some renewed respect.43 Though “Path” has never been out of print, these 
changing intellectual climates may make a new generation of readers more receptive to the 
intellectual commitments that underpin it. 
Conclusion  
Holmes, we are told, was not a very nice person. Aloof, self-centered, obsessed with his 
place in history. Though friendly with young liberals whose adulation he enjoyed, his own 
views seem to have been quite far from theirs. Not entirely without justification, readers 
identified certain fascistic tendencies in his thought. This has led many to read “The Path of 
the Law” as a bleak, cynical piece. But I do not think it is the most compelling way of 
reading it. Holmes seemed to have been in conflict with himself on all the questions he 
talked about in “Path.”44  He was a moral skeptic, but was not entirely indifferent to the fate 
of the humanity: He was actually keen on its improvement, with the help of eugenics if 
necessary.45 Perhaps it was due to the occasion, or the appreciation of being invited to give 
the talk, but I think in “Path” we see Holmes in his more optimistic mood, someone who is 
seeing in the law “the moral development of the race” (459) and presents the path the law 
                                                                 
43 See, e.g., David Armitage & Jo Guldi, Le retour de la longue durée : Une perspective angl0-
américaine, 70 ANNALES 289 (2015); David Christian, The Return of Universal History, 40 HIST. & 
THEORY, Dec. 2010 (Theme Issue), at 6. 
44 Those conflicts are on fine display in Holmes, supra note 38, at 414, where in a single long 
paragraph, Holmes touches on all the themes found in “Path,” demonstrating how they could be 
taken in different directions.  
45 This duality is more explicit in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1 
(1915). 
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needs to take in order to continue to serve needs of humanity against a changing 
environment. 
Such a positive, optimistic, view of the law is not obvious. It is quite an understatement 
to say that lawyers do not enjoy the best of reputations, that they exert a negative influence 
on society. And with barely an exception, lawyers do not make up the best individual 
human minds. And yet the combined efforts of middling individuals have created “one of 
the vastest products of the human mind” (473). It is easy (and necessary!) to decry the law 
for all its complexity, pomposity, confusions, and mediocrity, until one sees what happens 
to complex societies whose legal institutions break down. This too, I think, is part of the 
message of “The Path of the Law.”46 
 
 
 
                                                                 
46 Compare the words attributed to Holmes: “I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilization.” 
Quoted in FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 71 (2d ed. 1961). 
